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ABSTRACT. Slippery Slope Framework has attracted 
exceptional attention from researchers in economic 
psychology and taxation field through validation by 
renowned scholars via variety of surveys and experimental 
designs. However, application of cross-sectional analysis in 
validating the framework has been scant, the available 
studies being focused on a single continent only. This 
study aims to test the assumptions of “Slippery Slope 
Framework” through examination of the influence of trust 
in authorities and power of authorities on tax compliance 
globally. The sample of 158 countries was selected as of 
2016. Data was analyzed through Ordinary Least Squares 
Regression Analysis. The results reveal that trust in 
authorities significantly influences tax compliance, but 
power of authorities does not. Additionally, the interaction 
effect of trust and power on tax compliance has not been 
established through this cross-country analysis. Practically, 
the results suggest that authorities should ensure judicious 
use of taxpayer monies in the provision of public goods 
and services, and also fairness and equity among taxpayers. 
Eventually, these will enhance trust and improve tax 
compliance. Theoretically, the study calls for 
disaggregation analyses where each continent will be 
studied individually for replication of these findings and 
establishing the interaction effect wherever possible. 
JEL Classification: H2, H24, 
H25, H26 
Keywords: power, slippery slope framework, tax compliance, trust.  
Introduction 
Investigation of why individuals adhere to their tax obligations was hitherto dwelled 
on the “deterrence models” of Becker (1963), Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan 
(1973). While these models set the pace in understanding the factors influencing tax 
compliance, however, it was debated on for the failure to offer full explanation on why 
individuals pay taxes in the absence of enforcement. Following this argument, the way was 
paved for psychological factors into tax compliance literature through the concept of 
“psychological tax contract” proposed by Feld and Frey (2007) and Torgler, Demir, 
Macintyre and Schaffner (2008) for the elucidation of the antecedents to tax compliance. 
Further development in tax compliance literature was witnessed through the mixture of these 
two models; the “deterrence models” and the “psychological tax contract models”. This 
combination gave birth to a robust model, the “Slippery Slope Framework”. This framework 
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was the outcome of the work carried out by Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2008). It explained 
that optimal tax compliance is achievable either through trust in authorities (voluntary tax 
compliance) or through power of authorities (enforced tax compliance) or an interaction 
between them.  
Following these backgrounds, the central argument in this paper is the lack of 
comprehensive global evidence for cross-country analyses so that to provide global insights 
on the assumption of this framework. Earlier studies either centered on a single country, 
group of countries or at most a single component. European data in this regard was considered 
by (Benk & Dubak, 2011; Kastlunger, et al., 2013; Kirchler, et al., 2008; Kogler, et al., 2013; 
Pellizzari & Rizzi, 2014; Wahl, et al., 2010), while Asian experience was analyzed in 
(Andyarini, Subroto, & Subekti, 2019; Batrancea & Nichita, 2014; Faizal et al., 2017). A few 
studies that employed cross-country analyses were Mas' ud et al., (2015) and Mas’ud et al., 
(2014). However, these studies mainly focused on African states, hence, the need for global 
cross-country inference has motivated this paper. The global cross-country approach 
employed in this study will be novel in a number of ways. Firstly, the initial validation was 
mainly focused on Europe (Kastlunger, et al., 2013; Kirchler, et al., 2008; Kogler, et al., 2013; 
Pellizzari & Rizzi, 2014; Wahl, et al., 2010), later Asia (Andyarini, et al., 2019; Batrancea & 
Nichita, 2014; Faizal et al., 2017) and Africa (Mas' ud, et al., 2015; Mas’ud, et al., 2014; 
Ayuba,  Saad & Ariffin, 2018), and subsequently South America (da Silva, Guerreiro & 
Flores, 2019). Evidence from other continents such Australia and North America are lacking, 
to the best of our knowledge. Even when it exists, the findings are country-specific. This 
study tends to present uniform results across countries globally. Secondly, there are cultural 
variations across countries and continents, hence, providing uniform global evidence could 
blend culture and take care of cultural differences between countries. Thirdly, a much smaller 
sample was used in the previous cross-country analysis (Mas' ud et al., 20142015). The 
largest number of the countries sampled under such methodology was 37, while in this study 
158 countries were sampled, therefore, we expect to provide more robust results. Lastly, this 
robust result is expected to offer insights on universal applicability of the framework since it 
was tested using global cross-country data. 
Following these arguments, the objective of the study is twofold. First, it attempts to 
test the assumptions of the framework using cross-country data with a larger sample and from 
the global perspective. Second, the study examines the interaction effect of trust in authorities 
and power of authorities in explaining tax compliance using a large sample. 
In attaining such objectives of the study, the paper is divided into five parts, with this 
part as an introduction. The second part is the review of previous studies with empirical 
evidence on “Slippery Slope Framework”. The third part covers methodology and methods, 
while the fourth part focuses on analysis results. The last part presents conclusions, 
implications as well as recommendations for future research.  
1. Literature review 
Tax compliance has been defined by Jackson and Milliron (1986) as reporting all 
income, tax liabilities, and tax payments to the relevant tax authorities through the application 
of relevant tax laws, regulations, and tax orders. Voluntary tax compliance is considered as 
the “timely filing and reporting of required tax information, the correct self-assessment of 
taxes owed and the timely payment of those taxes without enforcement action” (Silvani & 
Baer, 1997, p. 11). While taxpayers usually pay taxes without enforcement action under 
voluntary tax compliance, enforced tax compliance is the one in which taxpayers pay their 
taxes due to fear of either being detected or audited. 
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While taxpayers pay tax through voluntary or enforcement compliance, the earlier 
deterrence tax compliance models such as those of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and 
Srinivasan (1973) fail to explain why taxpayers pay the tax without enforcement actions 
(Torgler, 2002, 2003). Consequently, the concept of psychological tax contract was 
introduced to explain why taxpayers pay taxes even without deterrence measures (Feld & 
Frey, 2007; Torgler, Demir, Macintyre, & Schaffner, 2008). To integrate the deterrence and 
psychological factors for better understanding of drivers of tax compliance, Slippery Slope 
Framework was introduced through a conceptual analysis which provides robust explanation 
(Kirchler, et al., 2008). The framework proposed that trust in authority and power of authority 
as well as interactions between them explain tax compliance. Trust in authorities means 
taxpayers believe that the authorities are compassionate, work for the common good of the 
citizens and are not corrupt, as such they ensure good governance of an economy (Kirchler, et 
al., 2008)  The power of authorities implies that taxpayers comply with their tax obligation 
due to fear of being detected through rigorous audit as well as the fine and penalty imposed 
by authorities for noncompliance (Kirchler, et al., 2008). In order to confirm whether or not 
the propositions of the Slippery Slope Framework hold in real world situations, various 
studies were undertaken for validation. For example, in Europe (Kastlunger, et al., 2013; 
Kirchler, et al., 2008; Kogler, et al., 2013; Pellizzari & Rizzi, 2014; Siglé, et al., 2018; Wahl, 
et al., 2010) and later Asia (Andyarini, Subroto, & Subekti, 2019; Batrancea & Nichita, 2014; 
Damayanti & Martono, 2018; Faizal et al., 2017; Mardhiah, Miranti & Tanton, 2019), Africa 
(Ayuba,  Saad & Ariffin, 2018; Mas' ud, et al., 2015;Mas’ud, et al., 2014), and South America 
(da Silva, Guerreiro & Flores, 2019). However, most of these validations are country specific, 
except a few such as Mas' ud, et al., (2015) and Mas’ud, et al., (2014) that have a continental 
focus with emphasis on Africa. Consequently, there is a need for the validation of the 
assumptions of the framework using global cross-country evidence so as to provide more 
robust findings.  
Conceptual framework and hypotheses development 
As noted earlier, the Slippery Slope Framework was introduced by Kirchler, et al. 
(2008) with two key determinants of tax compliance i.e. trust in authorities and power of 
authorities. The available evidence implied that the framework does not validate global cross-
country analysis. Thus, the following conceptual framework is proposed in this study for 








Figure1. Model for Validating the Slippery Slope Framework  
using Global Cross Country Data. 
 
Therefore, in line with the above framework and in an attempt to validate some of the 
assumption of the Slippery Slope Framework using global cross-country data, these 
hypotheses are proposed in line with the insights from the literature. Specifically, on one 
hand, Figure 1 proposed that trust in authorities will influence tax compliance. Trust means a 
belief by the taxpayers that tax authorities are compassionate, work beneficially for the 
Tax Compliance 
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common good of the citizens, ensure good governance and are not corrupt, which eventually 
develop moral obligation on the part of taxpayers such that they feel obliged to comply with 
their tax obligations. On the other hand, Figure 1 also proposed that power of authority will 
also influence tax compliance. Power of authority refers to the perception by taxpayers that 
tax officials have the ability to detect and punish illegal tax noncompliance through rigorous 
audit to detect the evasion and authorities’ power to fine the evaders. Beyond these individual 
influences, Figure 1 further proposed that trust in authorities and power of authorities interact 
and work together in influencing tax compliance, such that the existence of low trust needs to 
be complemented with high power and vice versa for significant tax compliance to take effect. 
The propositions of the framework was initially postulated by Kirchler, et al. (2008) and 
further validated by many scholars among European countries (Kastlunger, et al., 2013; 
Pellizzari & Rizzi, 2014; Siglé, et al., 2018), Asian countries (Andyarini et al., 2019; 
Damayanti & Martono, 2018;Mardhiah, et al.,  2019), Africa countries (Ayuba, et al., 2018; 
Mas' ud, et al., 2015) as well as South America (da Silva, et al., 2019). However, such 
validation has not been carried-out through global cross-country analysis, hence, Figure 1 
proposed such validation from a large sample of about 158 countries globally. 
Influence of trust in authorities on tax compliance 
The initial proposition by the slippery slope framework holds that trust in authorities 
predicts voluntary tax compliance (Kirchler, et al., 2008). In a logical synthesis, it was also 
concluded by Muehlbacher and Kirchler (2010) and Lisi (2011) that trust is crucial in 
explaining tax compliance. The first empirical evidence of slippery slope framework revealed 
a strong support for the postulation that trust is a predictor of voluntary tax compliance (Wahl, 
et al., 2010). Specifically, it was confirmed by Wahl, et al. that voluntary tax compliance is 
high in a scenario when authorities are trustworthy. Another finding also revealed that trust in 
authorities improves voluntary compliance, and voluntary tax compliance has a strong 
negative relationship with tax evasion (Muehlbacher, Kirchler, & Schwarzenberger, 2011). 
This finding was also confirmed in Italy (Kastlunger, et al., 2013). In Austria, Hungary, 
Romania and Russia empirical evidence from the test of the framework revealed that trust is a 
significant predictor of voluntary tax compliance (Kogler, et al., 2013). Findings by Pellizzari 
and Rizzi (2014) also confirmed such influence. Recent empirical evidence using self-
employed taxpayers in Austria also confirmed the direct influence of trust in authority on tax 
compliance (Kogler, Muehlbacher, & Kirchler, 2015). More recently, Faizal et al., (2017) 
proposed and confirmed the effect of trust in authority on tax compliance in Malaysia, as well 
as Siglé, et al., (2018) among corporate taxpayers in Netherland; Damayanti and Martono 
(2018) and Andyarini, et al., (2019) among individual taxpayers in Indonesia; Ayuba, et al 
(2018) among SMEs in Nigeria and da Silva et al (2019).  
Contrastingly, using cross-country data involving 37 nations in Africa, it was found 
that trust in authority, though correlated with tax compliance, it does not have any significant 
causing effect (Mas' ud, et al., 2015). Similarly, findings from data comprising 29 African 
countries showed that trust in authority individually does not influence tax compliance but it 
does through the interaction with the power of authorities (Mas’ud, et al., 2014). Despite all 
the available evidence around the world, empirical validation of the slippery slope framework 
is still not as expected in the extant literature. Moreover, there is paucity of proof in tax 
compliance literature regarding global cross-country analysis on the influence of trust in 
authorities on tax compliance; hence, the following hypothesis is proposed. 
 
H1: Trust in authorities has a significant positive influence on tax compliance 
globally. 
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 Influence of Power of Authorities on Tax Compliance. 
From its inception, the slippery slope framework proposed that power of authority 
influences enforced tax compliance (Kirchler, et al., 2008). By synthesizing the postulations 
of the framework through conceptual analysis, it was hypothesized that power of authorities 
can significantly influence enforced tax compliance (Lisi, 2011; Muehlbacher & Kirchler, 
2010). The pioneer empirical evidence on validation of framework’s postulations revealed 
that power of authorities significantly influences enforced tax compliance (Wahl, et al., 2010). 
Many studies in various settings confirmed the influence of power of authorities on enforced 
tax compliance ( Andyarini, et al., 2019; Damayanti & Martono, 2018; da Silva, Guerreiro & 
Flores, 2019; Kastlunger, et al., 2013; Kogler, et al., 2013; Kogler, et al., 2015; Muehlbacher, 
et al., 2011; Pellizzari & Rizzi, 2014; Prinz, Muehlbacher, & Kirchler, 2014; Siglé, et al., 
2018).  
Contrarily, a few studies using cross-country analysis power of authorities found 
insignificant causing effects on tax compliance (Mas' ud, et al., 2015; Mas’ud, et al., 2014). 
Moreover, it was found recently that neither legitimate power nor coercive power influence 
tax compliance (Faizal et al., 2017). More recently, additional evidences have further 
confirmed the existence of  insignificant effect of power of authority on tax compliance. Such 
has been reported in the study of corporate taxpayers in Netherland (Siglé, et al., 2018) and 
individual taxpayers in Indonesia (Mardhiah, Miranti & Tanton, 2019). 
Despite the ample evidence on the validation of slippery slope framework that 
provides mixed findings, global cross country analysis on the influence of power of authority 
on tax compliance is lacking, hence the need for more evidence. Thus, the development of the 
following hypothesis:  
 
H2: Power of authorities has a significant positive influence on tax compliance 
globally. 
Interaction effect of trust and power 
Initially, the proponents of Slippery Slope Framework (Kirchler, et al., 2008) postulate 
that trust and power interact in explaining tax compliance. This postulation has been validated 
in many studies (Kastlunger, et al., 2013; Kogler, et al., 2013; Kogler, et al., 2015; 
Muehlbacher, et al., 2011; Pellizzari & Rizzi, 2014; Prinz, Muehlbacher, & Kirchler, 2014). 
This was further confirmed through cross-country analysis among African countries (Mas’ud, 
et al., 2014). More recent evidence also confirmed interaction effects in the Slippery Slope 
Framework. For example, among SMEs in Nigeria (Ayuba, et al., 2018), among individuals 
in Central Java Indonesia (Damayanti & Martono, 2018) as well as among corporate 
taxpayers in Netherland (Siglé, et al., 2018).  
Despites these interesting findings which confirmed the interaction effects of trust in 
authority and power of authority in influencing tax compliance, evidence is lacking from 
global cross-country perspectives. Thus, validation of interaction effect of trust in authority 
and power of authority using global cross-country data will provide more evidence to the 
validation of the framework, hence, it is hypothesized as follows.  
 
H3: Power of authorities and trust in authorities significantly interact in influencing 
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2. Methodological approach 
This section discusses the methodology and methods used in conducting the study. It 
discusses the population and sample, variables and its measurement, data as well as data 
analysis techniques. 
The study has a population of 193 countries based on the United Nations membership. 
A sample of 158 countries was selected using the multi-stage sampling technique. In the first 
instance, all 193 countries were given equal chance of being selected. At the second instance, 
countries were dropped due to lack of data for one of the three (3) variables i.e. tax 
compliance, trust in authorities, and power of authorities. This process left us with only 158 
countries as the final sample. In essence, the participating countries in the analysis have all 
the data for the three variables while some countries were omitted due to a lack of one or 
more data for the three (3) variables under the study. 
The dependent variable, tax compliance (TC), was measured using tax percentage of 
GDP for all the countries. The percentage implied that low percentage is an indication of low 
tax compliance (higher evasion); likewise high percentage signifies high compliance (lower 
evasion). For the first independent variable that is trust in authorities (TRUST), Transparency 
International (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) was used as a proxy. The justification 
for using CPI scores as a proxy is based on similar studies which conducted cross-country 
analyses such as Kastlunger, et al., (2013); Mas'ud, Manaf and Saad (2014; 2015); Torgler, 
Schaffner, and Macintyre (2007); Torgler and Schneider (2009). A class interval of 0 to 100 
was used by TI in measuring CPI (i.e. very corrupt 0–9; 10-19; 20-29; 30-39; 40-49; 50-59; 
60-69; 70-79; 80–89; 90–100 low corrupt). For the second independent variable that is power 
of authorities (POWER), in line with earlier studies such as Kastlunger, et al., (2013); Mas'ud, 
Manaf and Saad (2014; 2015), rule of law was used as a proxy. The application of rule of law 
as a proxy of power of authorities is consistent with the definition of  rule of law in the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) by Kaufmann, Kraay and  Mastruzzi (2010). It was 
measured using percentiles of 0 to 100%  (i.e. low power 0–10th; 11-20th; 21-30th; 31-40th; 
41-50th; 51-60th; 61-70th; 71-80th; 81–90th; 91–100th high power). 
Due to the peculiarities of the variables, three sources were used in generating the 
data. For the dependent variable, i.e. tax compliance, for which tax as a percentage of GDP 
was used as proxy, the data was sourced from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
database for the year 2016 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). The data for the first 
independent variable that is trust in authorities, for which TI’s CPI was used as proxy, the 
data was sourced from Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index report for 
the year 2016 (TI, 2017).  For the second independent variable that is power of authorities, for 
which rule of law was used as a proxy, data was sourced from the World Bank Group (WBG) 
report for the year 2016 (World Bank Group, 2017).  
The analysis of the data was conducted through Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
Regression Analyses using SPSS version 22. Regression analysis is normally used when 
analyzing the influence of one or more independent variables (trust in authorities and power 
of authorities) on a dependent variable (tax compliance) (Pallant, 2001; 2005; Jeon, (2015). 
Jeon (2015) opined that regression analysis has some number of advantages such as (i) it 
enables the prediction or explanation of the relationship or effect of one or more variables on 
the other, (ii) it enables researchers to interpret results of predication or explanation easily, 
and, lastly, (3) it enables the testing of a theory that proposed prediction or explanation of the 
influence of one or more variables on the other. On the other hand, it has a number of 
limitations; (1) coefficient of determination which mostly explains the predictive power of the 
model cannot provide the extent of the importance of an additional predictor variable in a 
model by mere changes to R-square due to unaccounted interrelationship between the existing 
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and additional variables, (2) a variable can turn out to be statistically insignificant when 
combined with other variables in a regression model but could be statistically significant 
when regressed separately, regression analysis could not provide explanation to this variation. 
For instance, in the current model the combination of trust in authority and power of authority 
render power statistically insignificant; however, separate analysis may likely produce 
different results, notwithstanding this possibility due to a lack of theoretical support that has 
not been examined here, as the Slippery Slope Framework proposed the examination of the 
two variables in a single and not separate research model. Lastly, (3) where there are many 
regression equations for a single dependent variable which all turn out to be significant, 
selecting the best model could be problematic especially when there is no significant 
importance in the changes in R-square. Alternatively to OLS regression is the use of Co-
variance-Based Structural Equation Modeling (CB-SEM) and Partial Least Squares Structural 
Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM), however, its application for secondary data (particularly CB-
SEM due to its confirmatory nature) has not been commonly applicable in the literature (Hair, 
et al., 2018). The major problem with SEM is restrictive assumptions such as (1) the 
assumption that variables are measured without error, (2) residuals are not correlated and (3) 
causal flow is unidirectional (Jeon, 2015). However, in reality these assumptions are not 
provable because it is difficult to measure variables without error; it is also unreasonable to 
assume non-correlation among residuals from different equations (Jeon, 2015). Due to these 
reasons, OLS regression analysis was found to be more justified for data analysis in this 
study. 
3. Conducting research and results 
In this section, the results obtained from the data analysis which includes descriptive 
analysis of the study’s variables, tests of normality and colinearity, hierarchical regression 
analysis and model fit assessment are presented.  
3.1. Descriptive analysis  
Descriptive statistics analyses the nature of dispersion of the study’s variables. Here it 
presents results relating to minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation scores as 
contained in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of study variables 
 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TC 158 2.00 60.70 26.98 12.09 
TRUST 158 10.00 90.00 42.83 19.28 
POWER 158 .00 100.00 47.11 28.45 
 
The descriptive statistics depicted that 158 countries were analyzed in the study. The 
minimum tax compliance around the world measured using tax as a percentage of GDP is 2% 
while the maximum worldwide is 60.70%. The mean tax compliance is 26.98 while the 
standard deviation is 12.09. This implies that the average tax compliance around the world is 
26.98% except for about 12.09% countries whose tax compliance significantly differ from the 
global average score. For trust in authorities measured using CPI perception, the minimum 
perception of corruption is 10% while the maximum CP is 90% among the sample countries. 
The mean trust is 42.83 while the standard deviation is 19.28. This implies that the average 
trust among sample countries is 42.83% except for 19.28% of the sampled countries whose 
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trust score differs significantly from the average score. For the power of authorities measured 
using rule of law, the minimum score is 0 while the maximum is 100%. This means that the 
application of rule of law as a proxy of power of authority is 0% in some countries while is it 
up to 100% in others. The mean power is 47.11 with a standard deviation of 28.45. This 
implies that the average rule of law among the countries sampled in this study is 47.11% 
except for about 28.45% of the countries whose rule of law differs significantly from the 
global average. This high deviation could not be surprising considering that some countries 
recorded up to 100% in rule of law. Interestingly, in all the three cases, the descriptive 
analysis showed a good dispersion of scores across the study variables. 
3.2. Normality test 
In a regression analysis, one of the fundamental requirements is the normality of the 
data for variables under the study. It is required that the data should be normally distributed. 
Normality can be tested using both graphical and statistical approaches. This study adopts the 
statistical approach for testing normality. This approach postulates the use of Skewness and 
Kurtosis in testing the normality of data. The result of the normality test is contained in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Test of normality of the data 
 
Variables 
N Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
TC 158 .444 .193 -.394 .384 
TRUST 158 .739 .193 -.217 .384 
POWER 158 .150 .193 -1.108 .384 
 
The results of Skewness and Kurtosis used in testing the normality of data using 
statistical approach as contained in Table 2 indicated that the normality requirement is not 
violated in line with the suggestion of Curran et al (1996) and West et al (1995) who 
postulated that the values should be less than 2 and 7 for Skewness and Kurtosis respectively. 
To further confirm the normality of the data, Jarque-Bera statistic was used based on the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference between our distribution and a normal distribution. The 
result from the Jarque-Bera test statistics revealed that (Jarque-Bera χ55.25, 0.05 > p > 0.1), 
confirming no significant difference between distribution and a normal distribution.  
3.3. Test of multi-colinearity test 
Another fundamental requirement of regression analysis is multicolinearity among the 
study’s variables. It requires that two exogenous variables not perform equal function in a 
single regression model. Hair et al’s (2016) statistical approach of testing multicolinearity 
using Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was employed in this study as depicted 
in Table 3. 
 





TRUST .147 6.810 
POWER .147 6.810 
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The consistent cutoff values shows that none of the two independent variables violated 
the assumptions of multiclinearity based on the cut-off values of above than 0.1 for Tolerance 
and less than 10 for VIF. This result revealed that the two variables functioned independently 
in the research model. 
3.4. Regression Analysis and Hypotheses Testing 
Having satisfied the fundamental assumptions of regression analysis, Table 4 presents 
the result of the direct and interaction effect of trust in authorities and power of authorities on 
tax compliance.  
 



















 S.E Beta 
 TRUST .406 .188 .647 2.159 .032 Supported H1 
POWER .021 .083 .049 .249 .804 Not Supported H2 
TRUST*POWER .001 .002 -.133 .397 .692 Not Supported H3 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the regression analysis for hypotheses testing. 
Hypotheses one and two focused on the direct influence of trust in authorities and power of 
authorities on tax compliance while hypothesis three focused on interaction effects of the two 
independent variables on tax compliance. For the direct influence, it can be recalled that 
hypothesis one postulated that trust in authorities has significant positive influence on tax 
compliance globally. The result from 158 countries supported this postulation (β=0.406, 
t=2.159, p=.032). The finding is consistent with prior literature such as Muehlbacher and 
Kirchler (2010); Lisi (2011); Wahl, et al., (2010); Muehlbacher, Kirchler, and 
Schwarzenberger (2011); Kastlunger, et al., (2013); Kogler, et al., (2013); Pellizzari and Rizzi 
(2014); Kogler, Muehlbacher, and Kirchler (2015); and Faizal et al., (2017) which confirmed 
the effect of trust in authority on tax compliance. The result is also consistent with Siglé, et 
al., (2018) who confirmed the efffect of trust in authority on tax compliance among corporate 
taxpayers in Netherland. It is consitent with Damayanti and Martono (2018) and Andyarini, et 
al., (2019) who found the influence of trust in authority and power of authority among 
individual taxpayers in Indonesia as well as that of da Silva et al (2019) in Brazil. 
For hypothesis two, which postulated that power of authorities has significant positive 
influence on tax compliance globally, this hypothesis is not supported based on the analysis 
conducted using the data from 158 countries (β=-0.021, t= -0.249, p=.804). This is not 
surprising as findings from prior literature revealed a similar result. Specifically, it was found 
that neither legitimate power nor coercive power influence tax compliance (Faizal et al., 
2017). It is also consistent with the result of Mas' ud, et al., (2015) who found an insignificant 
effect of power of authority across African countries. It was also similar to that of Siglé, et al., 
(2018) who found no signficant influence of power on enforced tax compliance among 
corpoate taxpayers in Netherland as well as that of Mardhiah et al., (2019) who found 
insignificant influence of power of authority on enforced tax compliance among individual 
taxpayers in Indonesia. 
For the last hypothesis, which proposed the interaction effect of trust in authorities and 
power of authorities in influencing tax compliance globally, the hypothesis is not supported 
by the data from 158 countries (β=-0.001, t= -0.397, p=.692). This is consistent with the 
finding from African specific data analyzed by Mas’ud, et al., (2014) which found 
insignificant interaction effects of trust in authority and power of authority on tax compliance.  
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3.5. Model Fit 
In assessing the model fit, two criteria were used which were F-test and R-Square. For 
the first criterion, it can be seen from the model that the right selection of variable were made 
in an attempt to explain tax compliance. To put it differently, combining trust in authorities 
and power of authorities in a single research mode to explain tax compliance is found to be 
superb based on the F value which was found to be significant at less than 1%. 
For the second criterion i.e. R-square, the result showed that the data sufficiently fit 
the model as the variables used in the study were able to explain 31.7% of the changes in tax 
compliance. This can be considered above the moderate level of 15% in line with Cohen 
(1988). In essence, the R-square of the model shows that trust in authorities and power of 
authorities explains 31.7% of the variation of tax compliance. The remaining 68.3% can be 
explained by other variables not included in the current research model.  
Conclusion 
TThe study validates the key assumption of the “Slippery Slope Framework” from the 
perspective neglected by the extant literature. Out of the 193 countries under the United 
Nations member country list, 158 were used as a sample of the study to ensure global cross-
country validation of the framework using the data for 2016. From the analyses, it was found 
that trust in authorities has a significant positive influence on tax compliance while the power 
of authorities has not. The study also failed to establish significant interaction effect of trust in 
authorities and power of authorities on tax compliance using global cross-country data. 
 The finding indicates that trust in authorities is stronger than power of authorities in 
explaining tax compliance globally. Thus, the finding highlights the need to strengthen the 
two dimensions of trust (trust in central government and trust in tax authorities) in enhancing 
tax compliance globally. This means that the central government needs to ensure that the 
taxpayer monies are used judiciously in executing infrastructural projects and for the 
provision of public goods. For the tax authorities, they must ensure fairness and equity among 
the taxpayers by making it possible for each taxpayer to pay the correct amount of tax. 
Regarding the weak influence of power of authorities on tax compliance, it will continue to 
play a critical role in enhancing compliance since, in many instances; enforcement action is 
required before some taxpayers comply with their obligations.  
Theoretically, the study contributes not only to the “Slippery Slope Framework” but 
also to other psychological theories such as theory of trust (Brewster, 1998) as well as 
Cognitive Theory (Bandura, 1991) which postulates that individuals execute actions based on 
personal moral reasoning and internal obligations, as well as Social Exchange Theory 
(Emerson, 1976) which is based on the exchange negotiation among or between parties 
involved, indicating that when taxpayers perceive to receive benefit equal or more than what 
they pay as taxes they will be more willing to comply with their tax obligations.  
The study has been associated with a number of limitations which signifies the 
direction for future research. First, while the study attempted to validate the “Slippery Slope 
Framework” using all the countries around the world, it was only able to use 158 out of 193 
countries as it was constrained by a lack of data for some of the study’s variables in relation to 
those countries. Future research should try as much as possible to optimize the number of the 
countries to be used in the analysis beyond what has been used here. Secondly, the R-square 
of the model only explained 31.7% of the variation in tax compliance by the trust in 
authorities and power of authorities; this highlights the need to integrate other moderating and 
mediating variables that can possibly enhance the explanation of tax compliance beyond 
which had been explained by the only two variables. Future research should explore more on 
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this direction. Lastly, as this study failed to establish the significant influence of power of 
authorities and its interaction with trust in authorities in explaining tax compliance, future 
research should attempt in disaggregating the data into continents such as Africa, Asia, 
America and Europe. Possibly, the disaggregation of data can provide more interesting 
finding especially in relating to power of authorizes and its interaction with trust in authorities 
in explaining tax compliance.  
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